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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORTS-CHOICE OF LAW
REQUIRED BY FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Plaintiff, representafive of a passenger killed in an airplane crash
over the District of Columbia, sued the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, alleging that the negligence of a government control
tower operator in Virginia was a concurring cause of the accident.
The act states that the liability of the United States shall be governed
by the law of the place "where the act or omission occurred."' The
trial court found the control tower operator negligent and rendered
a judgment for $150,000, applying the statute of the District of Colum-
bia, which places no limit on the amount of recovery for wrongful
death.2 On appeal, held, affirmed in part and modified in part (2-1).
The Virginia statute,3 limiting recovery to $15,000, must be applied
since the negligence occurred in Virginia. United States v. Union
Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).4
In the field of torts the generally accepted conflict of laws disregards
the law of the place where the negligent act was committed and,
instead, applies the law of the place where the injury was sustained.5
This rule was applied in Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll6
when the defendant's employee, while in Alabama, negligently failed
to discover a weak link connecting two railroad cars and injury
resulted to plaintiff in Mississippi. Plaintiff, also an employee of
defendant, was denied recovery because of the fellow-servant rule
extant in Mississippi, although recovery would have been allowed
in Alabama under a statutory modification of this rule. In Cameron
v. Vandergriff,7 plaintiff was allowed to recover under the laws of
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1946).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-201 (1951).
3. VA. CODE § 8-636 (1950).
4. A major portion of the court's opinion was devoted to the application
of "discretionary function" as defined in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15 (1953). Excluded from the operation of the Federal Tort Claims Act is any
claim based "upon the exercise ... or failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function... on the part of... an employee of the Government .... "
The court was unanimous in holding that a government control tower opera-
tor's duties were not discretionary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1946).
5. Hermann v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. 646 (N.D. Cal. 1895); Leonard
v. Decker, 22 Fed. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1884); Darks v. Scudder-Gale Grocer Co.,
146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S.W. 430 (1910); Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 Atl. 775
(1936); GOODRI cH, CONFLICT or LAWS § 93 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLICT
or LAWS 187 (2d ed. 1951). But see Lindstrom v. International Nay. Co., 117
Fed. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 123 Fed. 475 (2d Cir. 1903),
cert. denied, 193 U.S. 699 (1904); Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387
(1932).
6. 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
7. 53 Ark. 381, 13 S.W. 1092 (1890).
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Arkansas for injuries sustained there although the negligent act oc-
curred in Indian Territory.
Notwithstanding the general rule, the majority of the court in the
instant case felt compelled to construe the Tort Claims Act strictly.
Although the rationale was not expressed, it might have been reasoned
that liability should not be extended beyond that intended by Con-
gress.8 However, this theory would seem to have questionable applica-
tion here, since a more liberal interpretation would not have broadened
liability under the act, but would merely have increased the amount
of recovery. The dissenting judge did not think the language of the
act required such a strict construction, nor did he think Congress
intended to disregard the traditional conflict of laws rule. He would
expand the word "act" to include not only a voluntary contraction of
muscles, but its consequences; in this case, the crash of the plane in the
District of Columbia. Language in at least two cases supports such an
expansion. In Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R.R., 9
the court, in applying the law of the place of the injury, said, "[T]he
locality of the act is deemed at common law to be the same as that of
the damage." In Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc.,'0 the negligent
act occurred on land and injury resulted when the interstate's plane
crashed more than a marine league from shore in Massachusetts Bay.
The court, retaining jurisdiction under the Death on the High Seas
Act," thought of the negligent "act" as continuing and being consum-
mated by the death of the intestate. The drafters of the Restatement
of Torts, however, excluded from the word "act" even the most direct
and immediate consequences.' 2
There is apparently no legislative history concerning this section of
the Tort Claims Act, and the instant case appears to be the first
decided in which the negligence of a government employee occurred in
one state and the injury to plaintiff in another. The absence of any
discussion by Congress prior to the passage of the act, has prompted
one writer to conclude that the words "act or omission" were accident-
ally employed.13 This conclusion seems reasonable, in view of the fact
8. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 99 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1938); 3 SUTHER-
LAM, STATUTORY CoNsTRUcTIoN § 6301 (3d ed., Horack 1943).
9. 78 N.H. 553, 103 Atl. 263 (1918) (defendant railroad started a fire in
Canada that burned plaintiff's bridge spanning Hall stream, the international
dividing line at that point; in determining liability for the part of the bridge
located in New Hampshire, the court applied the law of that state, disregarding
the law of the place where the act occurred.).
10. 95 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
11. This act gave district courts of the United States jurisdiction over suits
to recover damage "whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrong-
ful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league
from the shore of any state. . .." 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (1944).
(Emphasis added.).
12. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 2 (1934).
13. Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. REV. 447, 448
(1953). See also Gottlieb, State Law Versus a Federal Common Law of Torts.
7 VAN. L. REv. 206, 207 (1954).
[VOL,. 9
RECENT CASES
that Congress was primarily concerned with removing the immunity of
the Sovereign, and perhaps did not intend to anticipate the problems of
conflict of laws which might arise.14 It is unfortunate that these
particular words were used; had the statute read "according to the
law of the place where the tort occurred," the court undoubtedly would
have applied the law of the place of the injury.15 The place-of-the-act
rule may be difficult to apply in cases in which there is continuing
negligence, the original act occurring in State A followed by failure
to discover and correct in State B or C. The place-of-the-injury rule
has been generally followed because of its easy application and essen-
tial fairness. 16 In the absence of discussion by Congress, it seems doubt-
ful that a change in the usual tort conflict of laws rule was intended,
especially where Congress expressed the desire that the liability of the
United States be likened to that of a private person.'
7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-EXEMPTION
OF VETERANS FROM PAYMENT OF HUNTING
AND FISHING FEES
A non-veteran sought to have an Indiana statute' exempting vet-
erans from payment of hunting and fishing fees declared unconstitu-
tional on the ground that the exemption violated the equal protection
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Indiana Supreme
Court reversed a judgment of the circuit court upholding the statute2
and defendants petitioned for rehearing. Held (3-2), the exemption
violates the equal protection clause of the Indiana constitution;3 the
14. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35
GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1946).
15. "The locus delecti or place of wrong, is the place where the last event
necessary to make the actor liable for an alleged tort occurs." GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377
(1934); see also STUMBERG, CONFMCT OF LAWS 187 (2d ed. 1951).
16. Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest versus Motion in the Conllict of
Laws, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 881, 893 (1950). But see Rheinstein, The Place of
Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TuL. L. REV. 4 (1944); Ejarenz-
weig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason
Versus the Restatement, 36 DMON. L. REv. 1 (1951). The place-of-harm rule
was developed to be applied to cases involving injury to person or property
and difficulty will be encountered in applying the rule to cases involving
injury to intangible rights, e.g., widely published defamatory statements.
17. "The district courts.., shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States... under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)
(1953).
1. IND. ANN. STAT. § 11-1424 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1942).
2. Hanley v. State, 123 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1954).
3. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23. "The General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens."
1955]
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subject matter of the game and fish act provides no reasonable basis
for an exemption of veterans as a class. Hanley v. State, 126 N.E.2d 879
(Ind. 1955).
Not all legislative discrimination is prohibited by constitutional
guaranties of equal protection.4 A legislature may establish a class
and accord it special treatment if the classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary.5 However, the fact that the class defined corresponds to
some natural grouping, or is composed of those who seem to belong
together, is not enough;6 the definition must be based on a substantial
difference in the position of members of the class relating to the pur-
pose of the legislation and to the advancement of the public welfare.7
Finally, all persons similarly situated with respect to the announced
legislative purpose must be included.8
Statutes relating to veterans usually are designed to grant the
group certain privileges or immunities, and it is well settled that
former military service may be used as a basis for special legislative
4. "[N] either the (fourteenth) amendment-broad and comprehensive as
it is-nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of
the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to pro-
mote health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people. . .
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
5. "The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 147.(1940).
6. The test for reasonableness has been stated as follows:
"The rules by which this contention must be tested, as is shown by repeated
decisions of this court, are these: 1. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in
the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of dis-
cretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having
some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is
not made with mathematically nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitary.
Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79 (1911).
7. Essentially the same test for reasonableness of classification is used in both
the state and federal courts. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389
(1928); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927); Armour & Co. v,
North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916); Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913);
Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Watson v. Maryland,
218 U.S. 173 (1910); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1909); Minneapolis
& St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255,
51 So. 226 (1910); Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N.E. 394 (1932);
Motley v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners ,228 N.C. 337, 45 S.E.2d 550
(1947); State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 Atl. 1081 (1903); State ex Tel. Bacich
v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P.2d 1101 (1936).
8. Davis v. Teague, 220 Ala. 309, 125 So. 51 (1929), appeal dismissed, 281
U.S. 695 (1930) (for lack of federal question). See Tussman and tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALw. L. REV. 341 (1949).
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favor.9 The instant case is the first concerned with exemption of
veterans from payment of hunting and fishing license fees, but many
courts have considered the validity of exemption from payment of
occupational license fees, particularly peddlers' licenses.10 There has
been disagreement with respect to exemptions applicable only to dis-
abled and indigent veterans," but exemption of all veterans, without
reference to disability or indigence, has been declared unconstitutional
by every court 2 except the Supreme Court of New Jersey.'3 The
majority applied the rule that the classification must bear some rela-
tion to the subject matter of the license acts in order to be reasonable,14
and found that there is no relation between the business of a peddler,
as defined by the statute under consideration, and former military
service.
15
. The purpose of fish and game laws has been established by cases
involving the question of discrimination in the granting of hunting
and fishing licenses. It is settled that a state may preserve the rights
to wild life within the state for its own citizens, to the exclusion of
9. United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1878); People ex rel. Jendrick v.
Allman, 396 Ill. 35, 71 N.E.2d 44 (1947); Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182
N.E. 394 (1932); Farley v. Watt, 165 Okla. 6, 23 P.2d 687 (1933); Tennessee
Title Co. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 185 Tenn. 145, 203 S.W.2d
697 (1947); Larson v. City of Shelton, 37 Wash. 2d 481, 224 P.2d 1067 (1950).
Contra, State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 Atl. 1081 (1903).
10. See, Annot., 83 A.L.R. 1231 (1933).
11. Exemption upheld in Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150, 145 S.E. 57 (1928);
State v. Montgomery, 92 Me. 433, 43 Atl. 13 (1899); Farley v. Watt, 165 Okla. 6,
23 P.2d 687 (1933). Contra, Edelmann v. Fort Smith, 194 Ark. 100, 105 S.W.2d
528 (1937); Ex parte Jones, 38 Tex. Crim. 482, 43 S.W. 513 (1897).
12. Ratta v. Healy, 1 F. Supp. 669 (D.N.H. 1932), aff'd, 67 F.2d 554 (1st Cir.),
dismissed per curiam, 389 U.S. 701 (1933), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 292
U.S. 263 (1934); Marallis v. Chicago, 349 Ill. 422, 182 N.E. 394 (1932); State v.
Garbroski, 111 Iowa 496, 82 N.W. 959 (1900); Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass.
262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907); City of Laurens v. Anderson, 75 S.C. 62, 55 S.E. 136
(1906); State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54 Atl. 1081 (1903); Larson v. City of
Shelton, 37 Wash. 2d 481, 224 P.2d 1067 (1950); State v. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110,
99 N.W. 468 (1904). See also, McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54, 60 So. 392 (1912),
answer to certified question conformed to in 6 Ala. App. 19, 60 So. 406 (1912)
(an exemption of veterans from certain professional license payments not
in violation of the bill of rights of the state constitution, but is in conflict with
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution); In re Hum-
phrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179 (1929) (held, that exemption of veterans
from state bar examinations violated requirements of permissive classification).
But cf., Motley v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 228 N.C. 337, 45 S.E.2d 550
(1947) (upheld exemption of veterans who barbered for three years in
the service from barber examinations and fees).
13. Strauss v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 117 N.J.L. 45, 186 Atl. 691 (Sup. Ct.
1936), aff'd, 118 N.J.L. 561, 194 Atl. 160 (1937).
14. "Events long since past, and neither present conditions nor a difference
in situation between the honorably discharged soldiers and the other members
of the community or state are therefore the basis of the legislative classifica-
tion." Marallis v. Chicago, 348 Ill. 422, 182 N.E. 394, 398 (1932).
15. "The classification attempted by this statute is based on no apparent
necessity, or difference in conditions of circumstances that have any relation
whatsoever to the employment in which the veterans of the Civil War is
authorized to engage without paying license." State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa 496,
82 N.W. 959, 960 (1900).
19551
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nonresidents and aliens. 16 However, legislatures have not been
allowed to discriminate among the residents of a state.17 Distinctions
between eligible voters and nonvoters,18 the citizens of different coun-
ties,19 and persons of different ages have been found violative of state
constitutional guaranties of equal protection.20 The courts have agreed
that the purpose of license and conservation acts is the protection of
game and fish, that these classifications are contrary to the purpose of
the acts, and, therefore, arbitrary and unreasonable.
21
Both lines of authority seem to support the decision in the instant
case. The statute in question was distinguished from those which grant
a bonus or other consideration to veterans. The court found that the
statue was designed to provide funds for the propagation of game and
fish, and based its decision on the absence of any relation between the
purpose of the act and former military service. "There is no substantial
distinction between the present conditions and circumstances of vet-
erans in the attempted classification here in question and those of other
citizens of Indiana in relation to the protection and conservation of
fish and game.122 Thus the decision does not threaten existing veterans'
legislation which falls within the reasonable classification test.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-
PROCEDURE FOR REMOVAL OF JUDGE AN
INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIAL PROCESSES
While a criminal action against petitioner was pending on a motion
to dismiss the indictment, the district attorney filed an application
for change of judge. An Oregon statute' provided that no judge may
proceed with an action in which such an application is filed. Upon
the refusal of the judge to proceed, petitioner brought an original
mandamus proceeding in the Oregon Supreme Court, alleging that the
16. LaCoste v. Louisiana, 263 U.S. 545 (1924); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896); State ex rel. Spence v. Bryan, 87 Fla. 56, 99 So. 327 (1924).
But see, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
17. State v. Johnson, 172 Ark. 866, 291 S.W. 89 (1927); State ex rel. Spence
v. Bryan, 87 Fla. 56, 99 So. 327 (1924); Buntin v. Crowder, 173 Tenn. 386,
118 S.W.2d 221 (1927); State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P.2d 1101
(1936).
18. State v. Johnson, 172 Ark. 866, 291 S.W. 89 (1927).
19. State ex rel. Spence v. Bryan, 87 Fla. 56, 99 So. 327 (1924); State v.
Higgins, 51 S.C. 51, 8 S.E. 15 (1897); Buntin v. Crowder, 173 Tenn. 388, 118
S.W.2d 221 (1938).
20. State ex rel. Emerson v. Erickson, 159 Minn. 287, 198 N.W. 1000 (1924)
21. See note 17 supra.
22. Instant case at 883.
1. ORE. COmP. LAWS ANN. §§ 1-501, 502 (Supp. 1947).
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statute was unconstitutional. Held, a mandatory writ commanding
the judge to proceed must issue; the statute violates the principle of
separation of powers by allowing the disqualification of a judge with-
out a statement of facts showing bias or prejudice. State v. Vanden-
berg, 280 P.2d 344 (Ore. 1955).
A procedure by which a judge may be disqualified for bias or preju-
dice is provided by statute in nearly every state and in the federal
rules of procedure.2 The procedure most frequently employed requires
that an affidavit be filed setting forth facts to show that a fair trial
cannot be had under the presiding judge. Some statutes limit the
allegations to specific situations; 3 others do not define those facts upon
which a reasonable belief in bias or prejudice can exist.4 The federal
courts5 and the majority of the state courts6 have held that the judge
may rule upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit but may not in-
quire into the validity of the facts alleged. However, some statutes ex-
pressly permit a denial by the judge followed by a hearing and
determination of the alleged bias or prejudice.
7
The instant case illustrates the limitation on legislative power to
allow disqualification. The court found that a statute which allows
uncontrolled ability to remove a judge places a burden on the courts
amounting to legislative interference with the exercise of judicial
functions, forbidden by the principle of separation of powers.8 The
statute was compared with an earlier Oregon statute9 which required
that bias or prejudice be established by an affidavit containing a state-
ment that the affidavit was filed in good faith and not for the purpose
of delay. That statute had been considered by the court and found
2. The grounds upon which a judge could be disqualified at common law
have been the subject of disagreement. Blackstone denied that any such
grounds existed. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 361. Contra, Turner v. Com-
monwealth, 59 Ky. 619 (1859) (common law allowed disqualification of
judge related to one of the litigants); Woodmen of the World v. Alford, 206
Ala. 18, 89 So. 528 (1920) (any interest, the probable and natural tendency
of which is to create bias in the mind of the judge, could be grounds for dis-
qualification).
3. IND. A q. STAT. § 9-1303 (Burns 1933); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-201 (1956);
Wyo. Coi-A. STAT. ANN. § 3-1901 (1945).
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 144 (1949).
5. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1920); Refior v. Lansing Drop
Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 671 (1942); Mitchell v.
United States, 126 F.2d 550 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 702 (1942),
rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 887 (1945).
6. See State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695 (1938); Davis
v. Irwin, 65 Idaho 77, 139 P.2d 474 (1943); Branham v. Caudill, 264 Ky. 263,
94 S.W.2d 674 (1936).
7. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 170 (Deering 1953); see Bass v. Minich, 194 Ark.
589, 109 S.W.2d 139 (1937); Omohundro v. State, 172 Tenn. 48, 109 S.W.2d 1159
(1937).
8. See Austin v. Lambert, 11 Cal. 2d 73, 77 P.2d 849 (1938); Krug v. Superior
Court, 11 Cal. 2d 733, 77 P.2d 854 (1938) (similar statute held unconstitutional
on same ground).
9. ORE. Coam. LAws ANN'. §§ 1-501, 502 (Supp. 1943).
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constitutional. 0 The court pointed out that, although it was possible
for a judge to be disqualified for a cause other than bias or prejudice
under the former system, that result could be attained only by abuse
of the system, while its accomplishment was the manifest purpose of
the statute in question.
If the constitutionality of a disqualification procedure is to be de-
termined by the burden put upon the courts, it would seem that the dis-
tinction drawn by the court in the instant case is untenable. Certainly a
procedure designed to allow removal of a judge at the whim of the
parties unduly interferes with judicial processes; yet a statute which
purports to limit disqualification may be so easily abused that sub-
stantially the same burden is created. The requirement of an affidavit
of bias or prejudice, the truthfulness of which cannot be questioned,
does not seem sufficient assurance that the procedure will not be
used as a dilatory tactic." Adequate protection of the parties, on the
other hand, requires that a procedure for disqualification be readily
available. Perhaps the best solution is illustrated by the California
statute,12 which provides that questions of bias or prejudice shall be
heard and determined by some other judge agreed upon by the
parties.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE POLICE POWER-
RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION AMONG
EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES
Acting under authority of the Wisconsin code,' the Industrial Com-
mission of Milwaukee rejected plaintiff's application for a license
to operate an employment agency on the ground that the community
was adequately served by existing agencies. The circuit court affirmed
the commission's decision and plaintiff appealed, urging that the code
provision violated the due process clause of the Constitution.2 Held
(4-3) affirmed. The statute is a valid exercise of the police power
reserved to the states. Graebner v. Industrial Comm'n, 269 Wis. 252,
68 N.W.2d 714 (1955).
10. See U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac. 1074 (1926).
11. In one state it has been held that a statute providing for disqualification
without a hearing and determination of alleged bias as prejudice is an un-
constitutional deprivation of judicial power. Diehl v. Crump, 720 Okla. 108,
179 Pac. 4 (1919).
12. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 170 (Deering 1953).
1. [Tlhe industrial commission shall have . . .authority . . .to refuse to
issue such license... [if] it is found... that the number of employment agents
... is sufficient to supply the needs of employers and employees." WIs. STAT. §
105.13 (1949).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Power to protect a public interest through regulation of private
businesses is clearly within the powers reserved to the states, subject
only to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment. 3 Early Supreme
Court decisions developed the doctrine that state regulation for any
purpose is permissible only if "the business is affected with a public
interest."4 Dissatisfaction with the rigidity of this criterion5 brought
about its repudiation in 1934, when the Court, relying heavily upon
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann,6 held that regulation is permissible when a business, for
adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good.7 Two stand-
ards, suggested by Mr. Justice Brandeis, apparently are now major
considerations in determining the scope of a state's power to regulate
private businesses.8 First, does the regulation have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the public interest sought to be protected and yet
not exceed it, and, second, is the regulation neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable in view of the public good enhanced?9 These criteria,
while applicable to governmental control of private businesses in
general, also limit regulation which restricts the right to engage in
a particular business.10 Such regulation has been upheld, however,
when applied to a variety of businesses: historically, public carriers
and utilities;" more recently, slaughter-houses,12 private banks,
3
cotton gins, 14 laundries and dry-cleaners, 5 funeral homes,16 plumb-
ing,1? and many others.18
3. See U.S. CONsT. ANN. 982 (Corwin ed. 1952).
4. Miunn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of In-
dustrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). See 22 TEMP. L.Q. 338 (1948).
For origin and development of this phrase, see Hamilton, Affectation with a
Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930); McAllister, Lord Hale and Business
Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HiARv. L. REV. 759 (1930).
5. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359 (1928) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Stone); Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
6. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
7. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also Olsen v. Nebraska
ex rel. Western Reference, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
8. The limitations imposed by the due process clause require that "regu-
lation shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; and that the means
of regulation selected shall have a real or substantial relation to the object
sought to be obtained." 285 U.S. at 302.
9. Restating these questions in another way, it might be asked (1) is
this business subject to this type of regulation at all and (2) is the price
of the regulation reasonable considering the degree of public interest en-
hanced?
10. Replogle v. Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S.W. 353 (1925); People
ex rel. Durham Realty Co. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921).
11. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 282, 283 (1932).
12. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
13. Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128 (1911).
14. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1928); Hohman v. State,
122 Okla. 45, 250 Pac. 514 (1926).
15. State v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 197 S.E. 586 (1938). Contra, State v.
Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940); cf. Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39
S.E.2d 348 (1946) (similar statute concerning photographers invalid). See
also Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes,
17 N.C.L. REV. 1, 16, 17 (1939).
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The discouraging of fraudulent practices and usurious rates has
long been deemed sufficient to justify state regulation of employment
agencies.19 Thus the trade has been subjected to licensing on the
basis of good moral character, 20 and, more recently, to supervision of
rates,2' but not to regulation which amounts to virtual prohibition.22
Prior to the instant case, only one court had considered legislation
authorizing the denial of a license to a qualified applicant on the
ground that the public interest is better served by limiting the field
to those presently engaged in the business. The regulation was held
invalid.23 The Wisconsin court, despite a strong dissent which fears
"trends [leading] to a controlled economy," 24 evades discussion of the
basic issues, explaining that "we are bound by our precedents."2
Among the precedents relied upon by the court were decisions which
upheld legislation giving the mayor power to revoke a permit for
a public exhibition "whenever he shall consider it necessary and ex-
pedient for the good order of the city so to do,'" 26 and legislation em-
powering the municipal council, in its discretion, to issue or withhold
a license from a prospective junk dealer. 27 The dissenting justices
felt that no case cited by the majority justified denying a qualified
applicant the right to carry on a common calling simply because the
field was amply supplied, and that the public interest in an employ-
ment agency, while sufficient to support restrictions limiting entry
according to standards of conduct and fitness, did not require re-
striction designed to eliminate the undesirable aspects of competition
in the field.
28
Mr. Justice Brandeis' consideration that regulation must be no more
than is necessary to protect a public interest would lend weight to the
dissent, inasmuch as the public interest in employment agencies
primarily is in the prevention of fraudulent practices rather than in
the prevention of undesirable economic conditions similar to those
which justify regulation of public carriers and utilities. However,
16. State Bd. of Funeral Directors v. Cooksey, 148 Fla. 271, 4 So. 2d 253
(1941).
17. Roach v. City of Durham, 204 N.C. 587, 169 S.E. 149 (1933). But see
People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1951).
18. See cases collected in 11 Am. JuR., Const. Law §§ 286, 336 (1937). See
also Silverman, Bennett, and Lechiter, Control by Licensing Over Entry Into
the Market, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROm. 234 (1941).
19. Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916); Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, 61
N.E. 844 (1901).
20. Ibid. See also 11 AM. Jun., Const Law §§ 286, 336 (1937).
21. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
22. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
23. Engberg v. Debel, 194 Minn. 394, 260 N.W. 626 (1935).
24. Instant case at 718.
25. Id. at 716.
26. State ex rel. Bluemond Amusement Park, Inc. v. Mayor, 207 Wis. 199,
240 N.W. 847, 849 (1932).
27. Lerner v. City of Delavan, 203 Wis. 32, 233 N.W. 608 (1930).
28. Instant case at 718, 719.
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it has been argued that restriction of competition among employment
agencies bears an intimate relation to the protection of the public
from fraudulent practices,29 and that, even if the regulation exceeds
the danger, the court may not examine the wisdom behind the causes
of legislation, but only the effects.30
Determination of the constitutionality of legislation regulating pri-
vate businesses is generally left to the states.31 As a matter of policy, the
Supreme Court will allow the state's decision to stand unless the
regulation is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Therefore, despite
the fact that two courts have reached opposite conclusions, the
Supreme Court might not resolve the question in the instant case
one way or another. Recently the Court emphasized its "hands off"
policy, saying, "the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts"
for protection against this type of legislation.32
CONTEMPT OF COURT-SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF DIRECT
CONTEMPT-ATTORNEY'S ABSENCE FROM COURT
Petitioner, sole counsel for a defendant in a felony case, was late
returning to the trial after a noon recess. He had been tardy in at-
tending the same court on several previous occasions, once during this
trial. Upon the court's order to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt, petitioner replied that he had taken a nap
during the recess and accidentally overslept. The court declined to
believe this excuse and found petitioner guilty of contempt. Petitioner
sought annulment of the order of contempt on the ground that the
contempt, if any, was not committed in the presence of the court and
could be punished only after a proper hearing. Held (4-3), affirmed.
An attorney's absence from court is within the presence and knowledge
of the court; therefore, if the attorney presents no valid excuse, he
may be punished summarily for direct contempt. Lyons v. Superior
Court, 278 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1955).
29. Engberg v. Debel, 194 MVinn. 394, 260 N.W. 626, 628 (1935) (dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Devaney).
30. The court is not "a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.
." Day Brite Lighting Co. v. MVissouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
31. Differences of opinion as to the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the
legislation "suggest a choice which should be left to the states." Olsen v.
Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941); Day Brite
Lighting Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951). See also CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNOTATED (Corwin
ed. 1952); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States,
34MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
32. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
19551
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Contempt committed within the presence of the court is classified
as direct,' while that committed outside the presence of the court
is classified as indirect.2 The significance of the distinction lies in
the difference in method of punishment. In the case of a direct con-
tempt, the facts are known to the court and the contempt can be
punished summarily;3 in the case of an indirect contempt, an affidavit,
notice, and hearing usually are required before sentence can be im-
posed.4 The proper definition of the phrase "within the presence of
the court" has been the subject of disagreement. Some courts have
held that "any act which is calculated to impede, embarrass, or ob-
struct the court in the administration of justice is contempt committed
in the presence of the court.5 Other courts have held that only those
acts done within the court's "ocular view, or range of vision" are com-
mitted within the presence of the court.6
Failure of an attorney to attend court at the time appointed for
trial of a criminal case in which he is counsel of record may consti-
tute contempt if the attorney has no valid excuse.7 Other courts which
have considered the problem of classifying the contempt have adopted
the view advocated by the dissenting justices in the instant case:
that the absence, if a contempt, is indirect, punishable only after notice
and hearing.8 By ruling that the attorney's absence in the instant
case was a direct contempt, the trial court in effect decided that a
hearing was unnecessary to determine the validity of the attorney's
excuse; yet the reasons for his absence occurred away from the court
and out of its sight and hearing. Of course, prior instances of
tardiness known to the court may indicate that an attorney's excuse
for being late on a particular occasion is fabricated, but a judge can-
1. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); Blodgett v. Superior Court, 210
Cal. 1, 290 Pac. 293 (1930); Cooper v. People, 13 Colo. 337, 22 Pac. 790 (1889);
Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923); Ex parte Ratliff, 117 Tex.
325, 3 S.W.2d 406 (1928).
2. Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 111 S.E. 621 (1922); State v. Jones, 111
Ore. 295, 226 Pac. 433 (1924); Ex parte Duncan, 78 Tex. Crim. 447, 182 S.W.
313, (1916); Ex parte Ratliff, 117 Tex. 325, 3 S.W.2d 406 (1928) (dictum).
3. Ex parte Pugh, 30 Ariz. 129, 245 Pac. 273 (1926); Ex parte Lake 65 Cal
App. 420, 224 Pac. 126 (1924); People v. Sherwin, 334 Ill. 609, 166 ME. 513
(1929); In re Solberg, 51 S.D. 246, 213 N.W. 9 (1927).
4. Craddock v. Oliver, 23 Ala. App. 183, 123 So. 87 (1929); Ex parte Coulter,
160 Ark. 550, 255 S.W. 15 (1923); Gorham v. New Haven, 82 Conn. 153, 72
Atl. 1012 (1909); State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 623, 163 N.E. 272 (1928); Muffly
v. State, 129 Neb. 334, 261 N.W. 560 (1935). The California statute is char-
acteristic of those existing in other states. It provides for summary punish-
ment when the contempt is direct, and for affidavit, notice, and hearing when
the contempt is indirect. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1211 (Deering 1953).
5. See Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921); People v. Wilson,
64 Ill. 195, 16 Am. Rep. 528 (1872).
6. See State v. Root, 5 N.D. 487, 67 N.W. 590 (1896).
7. See In re McHugh, 152 Mich. 505, 116 N.W. 459 (1908); Ex parte Mackay,
140 Cal. App. 400, 35 P.2d 385 (1934); cf. Sellers v. Whaley, 84 Ga. App. 715, 67
S.E.2d 241 (1951).
8. Klein v. United States, 151 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Ex parte Clark, 208
Mo. 121, 106 S.W. 990 (1907); Ex parte Hill, 122 Tex. 80, 52 S.W.2d 367 (1932);
State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 Pac. 793 (1928); instant case at 685-88.
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not resolve an issue of fact solely on the basis of his personal knowl-
edge.9
Summary punishment for contempt is predicated on the idea that a
court must act quickly to prevent conduct which offends the authority
of the court and hinders the judicial process.10 The court in the instant
case was faced with the problem of determining whether such quick
action should be taken when an attorney is late to court, realizing that
the power to adjudicate a direct contempt is "necessarily of an arbi-
trary nature, and should be used with great prudence and caution."'"
If a hearing were required, the tardy attorney could introduce evidence
to show any justification he might have for being late, and the
court would be given a more accurate picture of the circumstances.
CORPORATIONS-INSPECTION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS-
RIGHT OF FORMER DIRECTOR
A director, who was not a stockholder, petitioned' for an order com-
pelling the corporation to permit him to inspect its books and records,
alleging mismanagement and misappropriation of corporate funds.
Also in dispute were certain legal fees petitioner claimed were due him
from the corporation. After a ruling of the court in petitioner's favor,
a stockholders' meeting was held and he was removed from office.
The court considered this new matter on an order to show cause,
but, on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits only, granted peti-
tioner's request for inspection notwithstanding that he no longer was
a director. On appeal by the corporation, petitioner contended that
he might have exposed himself to personal liability for what transpired
during his term of office, and to that extent was entitled to an in-
spection. Held, reversed and remitted. A discharged director has no
absolute right to inspect the corporate books, but he may have a
qualified right to inspect books covering a period of his directorship
if a showing is made by appropriate evidence that such inspection
is necessary to protect the former director's personal responsibility
interest as well as the interest of the stockholders.2 Cohen v. Cocoline
Products, Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127 N.E.2d 906 (1955).
9. Shafer v. City of Eau Claire, 105 Wis. 239, 81 N.W. 409 (1900); 9 WIG-
MORE EVIDENCE § 2569 (3d. ed. 1940); Annot., 113 A.L.R. 258 (1938).
10. See DANGEL, CONTEMPT § 446 (1939).
11. People ex rel. Field v. Turner, 1 Cal. 152, 153 (1850) (dictum).
1. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1283 (a proceeding in the nature of mandamus)-
2. In reversing, the majority held that granting petitioner's request on the
basis of the pleadings only was effectively granting an absolute right, be-
cause triable issues of fact were raised which could only have been resolved
after a hearing. Instant case at 908. Three dissenting justices reasoned that-
since petitioner was neither a director nor a stockholder, he had no rights at
all to the inspection. Id. at 909.
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A director stands in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and must
keep informed of its affairs in order to perform his duties intelligently.
For this reason the courts have universally recognized his common-
law right to inspect the corporate books and records. 3 Although the
remedy by which this right may be enforced is discretionary and
largely controlled by equitable principles, 4 some courts have held
that the right is absolute and the director's motives are not subject
to question.5 Other courts have expressed the view that his action
can be defeated by a showing of purposes hostile or inimical to the
corporation. 6 The New York courts early laid down the rule of abso-
lute right,7 and have held that where a wrongful purpose is established
the corporation's remedy is to remove the director from office.8 This
unconditional statement of the right of a director in office has served
as the basis for a corollary that no right to an inspection can exist
when he is out of office, regardless of his motives.9
The rigidity of the rule and of its supposed corollary has caused
the right of inspection to be the subject of conflicting decisions in
New York.'0 In Application of Hafter," a recently removed director
was denied inspection on the ground that the right existed only while
he possessed the status of a director. This case was cited as controlling
in four subsequent decisions where the question of motive was not
3. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 165 (rev. ed. 1946); 5 FLETCHER, PRIVATe
CORPORATIONS § 2235 (penn. ed. rev. repl. 1952); STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 109 (2d ed. 1949).
4. 34 AM. JuR., Mandamus § 33 (1941).
5. Wilkins v. M. Ascher Silk Corp., 207 App. Div. 168, 201 N.Y. Supp. 739
(1st Dep't 1923), aI'd mem., 237 N.Y. 574, 143 N.E. 748 (1924) (absolute right
irrespective of his motive); People ex rel. Leach v. Central Fish Co., 117 App.
Div. 77, 101 N.Y. Supp. 1108 (1st Dep't 1907) (all petitioner need show is
that he is a director, that he has demanded inspection and that his demand
has been refused); Drake v. Newton Amusement Corp., 123 N.J.L. 560, 9
A.2d 636 (1939); Machen v. Machen & Mayer Elec. Mfg. Co., 237 Pa. 212,
85 Atl. 100 (1912); State ex rel. Aultman v. Ice, 75 W. Va. 476, 84 S.E. 181
(1915). But see Strassburger v. Philadelphia Record Co., 335 Pa. 485, 6 A.2d
922, 924 (1939) (the court intimated that Pennsylvania may not still adhere to
this rule).
6. State ex rel. Paschall v. Scott, 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952), 51
MICH L. REV. 747, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1953); Hemingway v. Hemingway,
58 Conn. 443, 19 Atl. 766 (1890); Stone v. Kellogg, 165 Ill. 192, 46 N.E. 222,
227 (1896) (dictum).
7. People ex rel. Muir v. Throop, 12 Wend. 183 (N.Y. 1834).
8. "If the hostility assumes such a shape and goes to such an extent as
to justify his removal from the office the law has provided a method by
which that end can be accomplished, but, so long as he remains a director, he
cannot be denied the rights appertaining to the office." People ex rel. Leach
v. Central Fish Co., 117 App. Div. 77, 101 N.Y. Supp. 1108, 1110 (1st Dep't 1907).
9. Instant case at 909. This was the theory of the dissent.
10. This conflict has resulted where the director is incumbent-compare
Davis v. Keilsohn Offset Co., 273 App. Div. 695, 79 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1st Dep't
1948), with Melup v. Rubber Corp. of America, 181 Misc. 826, 43 N.Y.S.2d
444 (Sup. Ct. 1943)-as well as where the director has been removed-compare
Application of Minskoff, 192 Misc. 559, 80 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1948), with
Application of LaVin, 37 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
11. 67 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Sup. Ct.) affd, 270 App. Div. 995, 62 N.Y.S.2d 861
(1st Dep't 1946), ajFd mem. sub nom. Hafter v. Eagle Fish Co., 296 N.Y.
808, 71 N.E.2d 774 (1947).
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considered. 2 Prior to the Hafter case, inspection by former directors
was allowed "where the removal was sudden"'13 or was done to "flout
the determination of [the court]."'14 The possibility of personal liability
was considered in Halperin v. Air King Products Co.'5 and inspection
granted, but the court's emphasis on the applicant's stockholdings
distinguishes that decision from the instant case. In other jurisdictions
where removal from office has been pleaded in defense to directors'
suits for inspection, any question of their being a right of inspection
by virtue of the office of director was dismissed as being moot.16 How-
ever, the evidence in each of these cases showed motives hostile to
the corporation, and the courts seemed to prefer reaching an equitable
result on the point of the applicant's no longer holding the requisite
office, rather than the exercise of a discretion to deny inspection where
it is sought for an improper purpose.
In recognizing a qualified right of inspection out of office, the
court in the instant case has clarified the status of a discharged di-
rector, and, to a certain extent, equated his position with that of
a stockholder. Because a stockholder has an ownership interest to
safeguard, he is generally considered to have a right of inspection
conditioned on the showing of a proper purpose.17 The liability of
a director for mismanagement during his term of office continues
after his removal, and he may have this interest to protect. 8 The
court here found the protection of this interest to be proper for in-
spection, and emphasized that such inspection could benefit the stock-
holders by disclosing dereliction on the part of other directors and
officers. The possibility of injury to the corporation was left to the
consideration of the trial court in the exercise of its discretion. If
conflicting interests are shown, the problem could be met by appoint-
12. "Respondent was removed as a director of appellant corporation prior
to the making of the order under review, albeit after the institution of this
proceeding. Upon being relieved of his duty.. ., he no longer had the status
which would entitle him absolutely to the examination." Overland v. LeRoy
Foods, Inc., 279 App. Div. 876, 110 N.Y.S.2d 578, 579 (2d Dep't), af'd mem., 304
N.Y. 573, 107 N.E.2d 74 (1952); Hymes v. Riveredge Printers, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d
200 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Application of Minskoff, 192 Misc. 559, 80 N.Y.S.2d 863
(Sup. Ct. 1948); accord, Cravatts v. Klozo Fastener Corp., 205 Misc. 781, 133
N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
13. People ex rel. Stauffer v. Bonwit Bros., 69 Misc. 70, 125 N.Y. Supp. 958,
959 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
14. Application of LaVin, 37 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
15. 59 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
16. Dines v. Harris, 88 Colo. 22, 291 Pac. 1024 (1930); Leach v. Davy, 199
Mich. 378, 165 N.W. 927 (1917); Strassburger v. Philadelphia Record Co.,
335 Pa. 485, 6 A.2d 922 (1939).
17. Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Durr v. Paragon Trading
Corp., 270 N.Y. 464, 1 N.E.2d 967 (1936); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 159 (rev.
ed. 1946); 5 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2213-2226 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1952); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951).
18. Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649, 663 (1935);
Boyd v. Mutual Fire Ass'n, 116 Wis. 155, 90 N.W. 1086, 1093 (1902), modified
on rehearing, 116 Wis. 155, 94 N.W. 171 (1903) (statute of limitations had
run); 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 996 (Perm. ed. rev. repl. 1947).
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ing a neutral party to make the inspection.19 It should be noted that
the instant decision may have only academic value, as the exercise of
the right outlined by the court seems doubtful. An offer of proof
that inspection is necessary to protect the former director's personal
responsibility interest could invite a stockholders' suit for mismanage-
ment. On the other hand, if such a suit should be instituted, the





Plaintiff, a newspaper, sought a declaratory judgment determining
whether a proposed advertising program would violate a Connecticut
statute which prohibited "lotteries."' A food store wished plaintiff
to advertise a plan whereby persons entering the store would register
their names, the names so registered to be placed in a box and prizes
given to those persons whose names were withdrawn. There was no
requirement that a person be present at the drawing in order to receive
a prize, nor was a purchase at the store required for registration.
Plaintiff argued that the absence of actual payment of consideration
for participation and the absence of a requirement that the winner
be present at the drawing placed the activity outside the scope of
the statute. Held, payment of consideration is not essential, nor is
the possibility of a public gathering; any scheme wherein chance
is the predominant factor constitutes a "lottery" within the meaning
of the statute. Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, Ill A.2d 4 (Conn. 1955).
It is generally conceded that the term "lottery" has no technical
legal significance other than the popular one.2 Lottery was not a
19. News-Journal Corp. v. State ex rel. Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 187 So. 271
(1939). This form of relief was ordered where a stockholder was shown to
have competing interests.
20. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 324-27.
1. "LOTTERIES PROHIBITED. Any person who shall set up any lottery to raise
and collect money or for the sale of any property or shall, by any kind of
hazard, sell or dispose of any kind of property or set up a notification to
induce people to bring and deposit property to be disposed of in any such
manner or to risk their money or credit for the purpose of any such sale
or disposition, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned
not more than one year." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8667 (1949). The criminal
liability of the plaintiff newspaper was determined by CONN. GEN. STAT. §
8876 (1949), which reads in part: "CoNsPIRAcY. Any person who shall com-
bine, confederate or agree with another or others to accomplish any unlaw-
ful object by lawful means . . . shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars or imprisoned not more than fifteen years or both."
2. See, e.g., Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N.E.2d 648 (1937);
State v. Coats, 158 Ore. 122, 74 P.2d 1102 (1938); State v. Lindsey, 110 Vt.




common-law crime;3 indeed, in the early history of the United States,
lotteries were popular fund raising schemes of local governments. 4
However, its evils were recognized,5 and by 1892 prohibitive legisla-
tion had been enacted in every state.6 In the interpretation of these
statutes the rule evolved that three elements are essential components
of the forbidden activity: chance, prize, and consideration.7 An effective
weapon against actual gambling interests was provided but another
problem arose when enterprising merchants adopted advertising or
promotional plans containing some or all of these elements. Applica-
tion of the statutes to these activities has been determined by judicial
definition of the terms "prize," "chance," and "consideration" and the
extent to which merchants could devise schemes satisfactorily devoid
of the characteristics of gambling.
The courts have agreed that anything of value constitutes a prize;8
and, although "skill" has been distinguished from "chance," any great
degree of skill in a promotion scheme will necessarily decrease the
number of participants, with consequent loss of advertising value.9
As a result, consideration has been the factor most frequently sought
to be avoided by promotion-minded merchants.10 Absence of further
legislative action" has left the definition of this element of a lottery
3. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-
Great Falls Theater Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689 (1942).
4. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879). For a general discussion,
see Treadway, Lottery Laws in the United States; A Page from American
Legal History, 35 A.B.A.J. 385 (1949).
5. See Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449 (1893); Phalen v. Virginia, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850); Rosewell v. Jones, 41 N.M. 258, 67 P.2d 286 (1937).
6. Louisiana was the last state in the Union to pass a statute outlawing
lotteries. See Treadway, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., Affiliated Enterprises v. Rock-Ola 1fg. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3
(N.D. Ill. 1937); Grimes v. State, 235 Ala. 192, 178 So. 73 (1937); Barker v.
State, 56 Ga. App. 705, 193 S.E. 605 (1937); State v. Eames, 87 N.H. 477, 183
Atl. 590 (1936); City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 129 Tex. 40, 100
S.W.2d 695 (1936); Society Theater v. Seattle, 118 Wash. 258, 203 Pac. 21
(1922).
8. See, e.g., Long v. State, 74 Md. 565, 22 Atl. 4 (1891) (food); Common-
wealth v. Wright, 137 Mass. 250, 50 Am. Rep. 306 (1884) (small amount of
money); Baedaro v. Caldwell, 156 Neb. 489, 56 N.W.2d 706 (1953) (free game
on a pin ball machine); Carl Co. v. Lennon, 86 Misc. 255, 148 N.Y. Supp. 375
(Sup. Ct. 1914) (one dollar's worth of goods); Holloman v. State, 2 Tex.
Crim. 610 (1877) (small piece of jewelry in a fifty-cent box of candy).
9. See Meyer, Analysis of Business Lotteries and Promotions in Nebraska,
34 NEB. L. REV. 447 (1955).
10. See, e.g., State v. Dorau, 124 Conn. 160, 198 Atl. 573 (1938); State
ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689
(1942); State v. Eames, 87 N.H. 477, 183 Atl. 590 (1936).
11. Some twenty states have statutes which prohibit "gift enterprises." In
the "gift enterprize" a chance in a drawing is given to purchasers of mer-
chandise or other property. However, even in these states the rule remains that
prize, chance, and consideration are essential elements of liability. The
primary difference between "gift enterprise" and lottery is that the considera-
tion passes in connection with the purchase of merchandise rather than the
outright purchase of a lottery ticket. See, Long v. State, 74 Md. 565, 22 Atl. 4
(1891); Boon-Iseley Drug Co. v. Doughton, 189 N.C. 720, 128 S.E. 341 (1925);
City of Rosewell v. Jones, 41 N.M. 258, 67 P.2d 286 (1937); for a collection of
cases see Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1035 (1925).
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to the courts. Some courts have adopted the view that there must be
an actual payment of consideration; that mere incidental benefits
flowing to the merchant through increased sales are not sufficient.12
Other courts have followed the contractual theory of consideration,
holding that if the participant did anything he was not legally bound
to do, or refrained from doing anything he was legally free to do, there
was consideration. 3 Still other courts have held that no consideration
in any form is required if the combination of prize and chance alone
produces a desire to "get something for nothing," for that result in it-
self is contrary to the public policy embodied in a lottery statute.14
This is the view adopted by the court in the instant case.
An evaluation of these business promotion schemes in the light of
public policy would seem to require a consideration of the interests
involved and their relative value. On the one hand there is value to
the promoter-merchant, reflected in increased sales, and the value to
the community in increased advertising business, stimulation of com-
munity trade, and opportunity to share in the profits of the merchant.15
On the other hand, there is the danger of "bigger and better" prizes
rather than "bigger and better" products, increase of unfair trade prac-
tices between competing merchants,16 and recurrence of the evils and
excitement of public gambling. 7 Wh6ther the detriment to the public
interest outweighs the benefits to be derived would seem a matter for
12. Clark v. State, 80 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1954); Yellow-Stone Kit v. State 88
Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1890); People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. 788, 28 P.2d 99
(1933); Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893); Equitable Loan &
Security Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 44 S.E. 320, 22 L.R.A. 93 (1903); State v.
Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N.W. 608 (1936); Commonwealth v. Malco-
Memphis Theaters, 293 Ky. 531, 169 S.W.2d 596 (1934); State ex rel. District
Att'y Gen. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 170 Term. 351, 95 S.W.2d 310 (1936).
13. See Central States Theater Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Iowa
1935); Affiliated Enterprises v. Waller, 40 Del. 28, 5 A.2d 257 (1939); Maughs
v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S.E. 242 (1931); State ex rel. Regez v. Blumer,
236 Wis. 129, 294 N.W. 491 (1940). But see 18 VA. L. REV. 465 (1931).
14. See State ex re!. Hunter v. Omaha Motion Picture Exhibitors Ass'n,
139 Neb. 312, 297 N.W. 547 (1941).
15. In FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954), the Court
held that radio "give away" programs were not lotteries banned under 18
U.S.C.A. § 1304 (1950), which prohibits the broadcasting of lottery informa-
tion. The Court reasoned that the "furthering of trade" and the "material
benefits" to stations and advertisers from increased radio audience to be ex-
posed to advertising was not sufficient consideration to constitute lottery.
16. It has been held that the use of punch boards, lottery, gaming devices,
or gift devices as an inducement to purchase merchandise is an "unfair trade'
practice within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See, e.g.,
Wolf v. FTC, 135 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1943). In such a case, however, the con-
sideration for the chance is clear.
17. Those courts which have held the "business lottery promotion scheme"
subject to the prohibition of lottery statutes seem convinced that it leads
to the evils associated with gambling and is in fact worse, for it "enters the
very hearthside." See, e.g., Central States Theater Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Supp.
566 (S.D. Iowa 1935); Affiliated Enterprises v. Waller, 40 Del. 28, 5 A.2d 257
(1939). But see Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821 (1893), wherein the
court, speaking of a business lottery promotion scheme, stated, "and the
spirit of gambling is in no way cultivated or stimulated, which is the es-
sential evil of lotteries, and which our statute is enacted to prevent."
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the legislatures, which may forbid the activity by express omission
of the requirement of consideration in the definition of "lottery," or by
separate classification of the promotion scheme as a form of gambling.' s
The instant decision seems to be a judicial extension of antiquated
legislation designed to cover an entirely different fact situation.' 9
Loss of consideration by participants was a primary evil sought to be
eliminated by the lottery statutes.20 When a business promotion plan
is deemed productive of other gambling evils, it would seem the
better approach to await legislation condemning it as such, rather
than to extend the scope of a lottery statute by eliminating the re-
quirement of consideration.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ALIMONY-FIXED PAYMENTS TO
WIFE UNTIL HER DEATH OR REMARRIAGE AS BASIS
OF CLAIM AGAINST HUSBAND'S ESTATE.
Plaintiff was granted a divorce from her husband, and a settlement
agreement entered into by the parties was made part of the decree.
The agreement provided that monthly payments of $325 were to
be made to the plaintiff for the remainder of her life, or until she
remarried. When the payments ceased on the husband's death,
plaintiff filed a claim for them against his estate, based on the de-
cree. The probate court denied the claim and the circuit court affirmed.
On appeal, held, reversed. An agreement requiring monthly payments
until the death or remarriage of the wife constitutes a settlement of
alimony in gross which survives the death of the husband. Kucken-
becker v. Estate of Kuckenbecker, 4 Ill. App. 2d 314, 124 N.W.2d 52
(1955).
At common law absolute divorces were not granted, but alimony
in the form of continuing payments was awarded to a wife as her
18. At least one court has based its refusal to extend a lottery statute to cover
situations like the one at bar on the danger of usurping the power of the
legislature. See State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corp.,
114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689 (1942).
19. The Connecticut general lottery statute, note 1 supra, was passed in 1728,
substantially revised in 1865, with only a few minor changes in 1930, into its
present form. The court placed great emphasis on the fact that a prior
Connecticut case, State v. Dorau, 124 Conn. 160, 198 Atl. 573 (1938), in which
the court had held the statute applicable to a theater "bank night" lottery
scheme, had not led to any new legislation. In fact a bill had been proposed
in the Connecticut legislature seeking to allow "bank night" in the state
and had failed to pass. See instant case at 9.
20. "[O]n the other [side there is] the sacrifice of the savings by the
ignorant and credulous, and excitement, destructive of regular industry,
often inducing insanity. It is to supress this species of lottery, we should re-
member, that the lottery statute was aimed." Rosewell v. Jones, 41 N.M. 258,
67 P.2d 286, 289 (1937) [quoting from 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1778 (12th
ed. 1932) ].
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means of support after a separation, the theory being that the husband
still owed a duty to support his wife.' The great majority of American
courts adopted the view that an award of alimony following an
absolute divorce cannot be made in the absence of statute,2 but the
theory of an award of continuing payments has been considered the
same: the duty of the husband to support his wife. For this reason
the award may be terminated upon the remarriage of the wife or the
death of the husband3 and may be modified upon a change of circum-
stances.4
Alimony in gross is a lump sum award of the court made at the
suggestion of one or both of the parties, if authorized by statute.5 It can
be made payable in a lump sum, or periodic installments.6 The theory
of such an award is that the granting of an absolute divorce causes the
wife to lose her inchoate rights, and she should be compensated ac-
cordingly by the husband.7 Most courts have held that, unlike an
award requiring continuous payments in an undetermined amount, an
award of alimony in gross creates a vested right which survives the
remarriage of the wife8 and the death of the husband, 9 and cannot be
modified by the court. 10
The difficulty of determining the kind and amount of alimony to be
awarded is often avoided by incorporating in the divorce decree a
contractual agreement between the parties providing for the dis-
1. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 300 Ky. 209, 187 S.W.2d 804 (1945); Cuwell v.
Culwell, 23 Tenn. App. 389, 133 S.W.2d 1009 (M.S. 1939); accord, Schneider
v. Schneider, 286 Ill. App. 575, 4 N.E.2d 123 (1936).
2. Lyon v. Lyon, 318 Mass. 646, 63 N.E.2d 459 (1945); Walker v. Walker, 155
N.Y. 77, 49 N.E. 663 (1898); Brown v. Brown, 156 Tenn. 619, 4 S.W.2d 345
(1928). Contra, Wilson v. Wilson, 178 Va. 427, 17 S.E.2d 397 (1941). See
MADDEN, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS §§ 97-98 (1931); 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS § 104 (1932).
3. Accord, Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236 (1905); Brandon v.
Brandon, 175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929 (1940), 16 TENN. L. REV. 468; Murphy
v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P.2d 247 (1935). Contra, Southard v. Southard,
262 Mass. 278, 159 N.E. 512 (1928), 37 YALE L.J. 994. But upon the wife's
remarriage, the first husband must apply for termination of alimony. Cohen v.
Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (1906); Mindlin v. Mindlin, 41 N.M. 155, 66
P.2d 260 (1937); Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E.2d 852, 112 A.L.R.
243 (1937).
4. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 166 Mich. 248, 131 N.W. 542 (1911); Nelson v. Nelson,
282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (1920); Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 Pac. 123,
30 A.L.R. 74 (1923). In absence of statute see, Morgan v. Morgan, 211 Ala. 7,
99 So. 185 (1924).
5. See Roubicek v. Roubicek, 246 Ala. 442, 21 So. 2d 244 (1945); Turner
v. Ewald, 290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181 (1942); Jones v. Jones, 216 Ky. 810, 288
S. W. 737 (1926); Baird v. Baird, 311 Mass. 329, 41 N.E.2d 5 (1942); Rush v.
Rush, 33 Tenn. App. 496, 232 S.W.2d 333 (W.S. 1949).
6. See De Roche v. De Roche, 12 N.D. 17, 94 N.W. 767 (1903); Winslow v.
Winslow, 133 Tenn. 663, 182 S.W. 241 (1916).
7. MADDEN, DOMEsTIC RELATIONS §§ 97-98 (1931); accord, Leutzinger v.
McNeely, 216 Mo. App. 699, 273 S.W. 241 (1925).
8. Gilcrease v. Gilcrease, 186 Okla. 451, 98 P.2d 906, 127 A.L.R. 725 (1939),
9. Smith v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 581, 112 So. 190 (1927).
10. See Graham v. Graham, 135 Neb. 761, 284 N.W. 280 (1939); cf. Stefonick
v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848 (1946) (refusal to award alimony in
gross because it could not be modified).
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position of their property, in the nature of a property settlement."
The disposition may be in the form of a lump sum payment or periodic
payments by the husband, or a transfer of property between the
parties.12 Incorporation of such an agreement in a divorce decree
encourages the parties to settle their differences as they see fit, sub-
ject to the approval of the court.'3 Most courts agree that a settle-
ment agreement made part of a divorce decree does not lose its con-
tractual nature and, therefore, cannot be modified.14 However, many
courts have held that when an agreement provides for both a lump
sum settlement and periodic payments in an undetermined amount,
the lump sum payment is the property settlement 5 and the periodic
payments constitute alimony which is modifiable, and terminable
upon the remarriage of the wife or the death of the husband.
16
In interpreting the agreement in the instant case, the court relied
on Walters v. Walters,1" an earlier Illinois case in which an agreement
to pay the wife $34,450 over a period of ten years was declared to be
a property settlement which could not be modified by the court,
and which survived the remarriage of the wife. The court in the
instant case reached the conclusion that the payments in question con-
stituted alimony in gross despite the fact that they were to continue
until the wife's death or remarriage, an uncertain period of time, and
could not have been installments of a fixed sum. The court assumed
from the language of the agreement that the parties intended the
payments to continue after the husband's death 8 and based its de-
cision thereon without attempting to reconcile such an intention with
the rule that an award of continuing alimony payments may be
terminated on the death of the husband.19 In giving effect to the in-
tention, the court greatly broadened the meaning of alimony in
gross. However, the result seems reasonable, if the parties are free
to settle their respective rights as they see fit.
20
11. Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 20, 116 S.E. 482 (1923); see Dickey v.
Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 Atl. 387 (1928) (recognized settlement agreement as
distinct from alimony).
12. See North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936); cf. Colton v.
Colton, 252 Ala. 442, 41 So. 2d 398 (1949).
13. Gross v. Gross, 154 Fla. 649, 18 So. 2d 538 (1944); Elliott v. Dunham,
191 Okla. 395, 130 P.2d 534 (1942).
14. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 215 Ala. 627, 111 So. 911 (1927); Turner v. Ewald,
290 Ky. 833, 162 S.W.2d 181 (1942); Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 Atl.
387 (1928).
15. Borton v. Borton, 230 Ala. 630, 162 So. 529 (1935).
16. Borton v. Borton, supra note 15; Doty v. Doty, 37 Tenn. App. 120, 260
S.W.2d 411 (W.S. 1952), 7 VAnD. L. REV. 835, 840-41 (1954). Contra, Erwin v.
Erwin, 179 Ark. 192, 14 S.W.2d 1100 (1929).
17. 409 Ill. 298, 99 N.E.2d 342 (1951).
18. The court in discussing the intent of the parties made only passing
reference to a life insurance policy which the husband agreed to maintain.
The policy was payable to the wife on the same terms as the monthly pay-
ments. Such a provision would seem to indicate an intention that the in-
surance proceeds would begin in lieu of the monthly payments after the
husband's death. Instant case at 54.
19. See note 16 supra.
20. See Pryor v. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302, 114 S.W. 700 (1908); Brown v. Brown,
209 Mo. App. 416, 239 S.W. 1093 (1922).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE AND ALIMONY-AWARD
OF ALIMONY TO ADULTEROUS WIFE
When a wife sought divorce for extreme cruelty, the husband
brought a cross action on grounds of adultery and cruelty. Both parties
were found guilty of the offenses alleged. A California statute had
been interpreted as a modification of the strict rule of recrimination;'
accordingly, the trial court granted a divorce to both parties and
awarded the wife alimony. The husband appealed on the ground
that the trial court erred in failing to find that his cross action was in
bar of the wife's suit, and in awarding the wife alimony. A district
court of appeal affirmed (2-1) ,2 and the husband appealed to the
supreme court. Held (4-3), affirmed, and the opinion of the district
court vacated. A wife's adultery is not an absolute bar to a decree of
divorce and alimony when her husband is found guilty of marital fault.
Mueller v. Mueller, 282 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1955).
Traditionally, the courts in this country have followed a strict rule
of recrimination when both parties to a marriage show grounds for
divorce.3 The rule requires that a divorce be denied to both, regardless
of the nature of the conduct of which each is guilty.4 The basis of the
rule seems to be the "clean hands" maxim,5 although some courts
indicate that relief is denied because both parties have breached the
mutually dependent marriage covenants.6 When a wife alone is
guilty of marital fault and the husband is granted a divorce, an award
of alimony to the wife is dependent upon statutory authority.7 Most
courts have adopted the view that they have no inherent power to
award alimony after an absolute divorce, and in the absence of a
statute authorizing an award of alimony to a wife against whom a
divorce is decreed, have applied the common-law rule that a guilty
wife is not entitled to alimony.8
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 111 (Deering 1949); DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858,
250 P.2d 598 (1952).
2. Mueller v. Mueller, 276 P.2d 693 (Cal. App. 1954).
3. 17 Am. Jun., Divorce and Separation §§ 233, 235 (1938); 27 C.J.S., Divorce
§ 67 (1941). The rule has been known to the law since early Biblical times.
See DEUTERONOMY XXII, 13-19.
4. 2 Bisnop, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 66 (6th ed. 1881).
5. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 120 W. Va. 389, 198 S.E. 209 (1938); 17 Am. Jun., Divorce
and Separation § 233 (1938).
6. See Brazell v. Brazell, 54 Cal. App. 2d 458, 129 P.2d 117 (1942) (using
both clean hands and contract theories).
7. See Nolen v. Nolen, 121 Fla. 130, 163 So. 401 (1935); Garner v. Garner, 182
Ore. 549, 189 P.2d 397 (1948); 2 BisHop, AIA AND DIVORCE 406 (6th ed.
1881). But see Flaxman v. Flaxman, 177 Okla. 28, 57 P.2d 819 (1936); Alldredge
v. Alldredge, 229 P.2d 681 (Utah 1951).
8. See Quarles v. Quarles, 179 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Schneider v.
Schneider, 286 Ill. App. 575, 4 N.E.2d 123 (1936); 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS § 78 (1932). In some jurisdictions alimony may be awarded to a wife
when the husband is granted the divorce. See Baker v. Baker, 271 Ky. 735,
113 S.W.2d 16 (1938); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 302 Mich. 491, 5 N.W.2d 438 (1942);
Flaxman v. Flaxman, 177 Okla. 28, 57 P.2d 819 (1936); Warning v. Warning,
5 Wash. 2d 398, 105 P.2d 715 (1940).
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In recent years, the traditional view has been rejected in many
jurisdictions, by statute9 and by judicial mandate.10 Generally, those
courts which have departed from strict recrimination have done so
by adopting the rule of comparative rectitude, which provides a frame-
work within which the rule of recrimination may be relaxed to the
extent believed necessary to achieve the most equitable and most
socially desirable result. The rule permits the trial court, when both
parties are guilty of marital fault, in its discretion, nevertheless to
grant a divorce to the less guilty party." As a result, an award of
alimony may be made to a less guilty wife.
The California statute provides that a wife may not receive alimony
unless she is granted a divorce, and that a divorce must be denied
"upon a showing by the defendant of any cause of action against
the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of action."' 2 In DeBurgh v.
DeBurgh, 3 the California Supreme Court held that the statute does
not require strict recrimination, but, instead, gives the trial court
discretion in determining whether a defendant's cause of action is
"in bar" of the plaintiff's suit. The discretion was said to rest not
alone upon a comparison of the guilt of the parties, but upon a con-
sideration of whether the good of society and of the parties requires
that the marriage be terminated. The court's interpretation also
allowed the trial court discretion to award alimony upon the granting
of a double divorce.
The decision in the instant case illustrates the minor importance of
comparative guilt in the application of the DeBurgh rule, and, in effect
demonstrates the abrogation of recrimination in favor of socially desir-
able results. Although the court discussed the wife's adultery as a
factor in determining whether she should be awarded alimony, the
necessity of granting her a divorce in order to award her alimony
required the court to find that the adultery was not a cause of action
"in bar" of the wife's suit. Yet adultery has been considered the worst
matrimonial offense.14 The court's emphasis on the wife's ill health
and impaired earning capacity indicated that these were the con-
trolling considerations in affirming the award of alimony. If so, the
determination of whether a husband's cause of action is "in bar" of a
wife's suit will depend, not on the grounds he alleges, but on the
acuteness of the wife's need-an anomalous result which should be
cured by legislative action.
9. See 2 VERNIER, AM EICAN FAmILY LAWS § 78 (1932).
10. Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946); Huff v. Huff,
178 Wash. 684, 35 P.2d 86 (1934).
11. See generally 17 Am. JUR., Divorce and Separation § 235 (1938); Annot.,
63 A.L.R. 1132 (1929).
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 139 (Deering Supp. 1955).
13. 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
14. See 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 73 (6th ed. 1881); MADDEN, PERSONS
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 305 (1931). Many statutes which modify recrimina-
tion specifically provide that the plaintiff's adultery is a good defense. See 2
VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 78 (1932).
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TORTS-COMMON CARRIERS-LIABILITY TO PASSENGERS
FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF STRANGERS
Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's electric trolley car, was struck
by a piece of concrete intentionally thrown at the car by a young boy
standing off the right of way. He brought suit to recover for his re-
sulting injuries, alleging that they were caused by defendant's neg-
ligence in failing to foresee the danger and guard against it. Evidence
was introduced to show that objects had been thrown at defendant's
cars along the same segment of the trolly line at least sixteen times
within the past four years, and that defendant had known of these
occurrences. Defendant appealed from a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff on the ground that there was no evidence upon which a find-
ing of negligence could be based. Held, affirmed. A common carrier
may be. required to protect its passengers from tortious acts of
strangers which the carrier could reasonably anticipate from its knowl-
edge that similar acts have frequently occurred. Harpell v. Public
Service Coordinated Transport, 114 A.2d 295 (N.J. Super. 1955).
The courts have not agreed upon the terms to be used in describing
to a jury the degree of care owned by a common carrier to its pas-
sengers,' but the differences lie primarily in a choice of words and do
not ordinarily represent a conflict of views.2 Whatever may be the
language adopted, it is clear that the standard is high.3 However, a
common carrier is not an absolute insurer of the safety of its pas-
sengers.4 Ordinarily, it is not bound to anticipate that a third party
1. HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS § 501 (1st ed. 1882); 2 MIcmE, CARRIERS 1718 (1915).
2. Coblentz v. Jaloff, 115 Ore. 656, 239 Pac. 825 (1925). See, e.g., Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Galvin, 54 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1931) ("utmost"); Atchin-
son, T. & S. Fe R.R. v. Shean, 18 Colo. 368, 33 Pac. 108 (1893) ("extraordinary") ;
Shally v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Bd., 159 La. App. 519, 105 So. 606 (1925)
("strictest"); Bennett v. Bartlett, 158 S.E. 712 (W.Va. 1931) ("highest").
3. See Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252 (1916); Alabama Power
Co. v. Maddox, 227 Ala. 628, 151 So. 575 (1933); Bezera v. Associated Oil Co.,
117 Cal. App. 139, 3 P.2d 622 (1931); Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316,
175 Atl. 679 (1934); Peak v. Louisville & N.R.R., 221 Ky. 97, 297 S.W. 1107
(1927); Guinevan v. Checker Cab Co., 289 Mass. 295, 194 N.E. 100 (1935);
Durfey v. Milligan, 265 Mich. 97, 251 N.W. 356 (1933); Wright v. Boston &
M.R.R,. 83 N.H. 136, 139 Atl. 370 (1927); Ramsdell v. Frederick, 132 Ore. 161,
285 Pac. 219 (1930); Hughes v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 300 Pa. 474, 150 Ati.
153 (1930); Hogan v. Miller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540 (1931); Scales v. Boynton
Cab Co., 198 Wis. 293, 223 N.W. 836 (1929).
4. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950);
Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 106 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Waddell
v. Crescent Motors, Inc., 260 Ala. 124, 69 So. 2d 414 (1953); Irwin v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 161 Ala. 489, 50 So. 62 (1909); Miller v. Mills, 257 S.W.2d 520 (Ky.
1953); Louisville Ry. v. Logan, 306 Ky. 35, 206 S.W.2d 80 (1947); Schooler v.
Louisville & I.R.R., 259 Ky. 80, 82 S.W.2d 221 (1935); Brown v. Gonzales, 77
So. 2d 887 (La. App. 1955); Baker v. Shreveport Ry., 68 So. 2d 228 (La. App.
1953); Fewings v. Mendenhall, 88 Minn. 336, 93 N.W. 127 (1903); Woas v. St.
Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 664, 96 S.W. 1017 (1906); Rourke v. Hershock, 3
N.J. 422, 70 A.2d 489 (1950); Archer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. Super. 538,
72 A.2d 609 (1950); Bosworth v. Union Ry., 26 R.I. 309, 58 Atl. 982 (1904);
Knoxville Cab Co. v. Miller, 176 Tenn. 88, 138 S.W.2d 428 (1940); Bennevendo
v. Houston Transit Co., 238 S.W.2d 271, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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will intentionally interfere or meddle with the carrier or its operation.5
A carrier is liable for the tortious act of a stranger resulting in injury
to a passenger only when the carrier knew, or in the exercise of due
care should have known, of the imminency of the tort and failed to
use care to prevent its occurrence after a sufficient opportunity to do
SO. 6
To show that a carrier should have anticipated the act of a stranger,
plaintiffs have often submitted evidence of safety-history-that is,
evidence of similar occurrences in the past. Generally, the courts have
been prone to accept such evidence, although they have not agreed
upon the weight to be accorded it.7 In the instant case, evidence that
the defendant knew of sixteen similar incidents in the past four years
was said to justify a finding that the defendant had a duty to exercise
care for the protection of its passengers. But in Schooler v. Louisville
& Interurban R.R.,3 the court found that no duty existed despite evi-
dence that rocks and garbage had been thrown at the carrier nearly
every night for the past three years. Once a duty has been established
by safety-history evidence, it is important to recognize that such evi-
dence is seldom conclusive as proof of a breach of that duty. Accidents
often occur in safe places; anywhere that a large number of persons
pass is likely to be a spot where several accidents have happened, re-
gardless of the safe condition of the premises.9 It is up to the judge to
check the jury from formulating unsound general theories as to the
weight of this statistical evidence on the issue of negligence. 10
The determination of whether a breach of duty has been committeed
involves an element of practicality; that is, a balancing of the magni-
tude of the risk and the utility of the risk. A carrier is not bound to
employ every protective device which the ingenuity of man could
provide. For example, a railroad should not be forced to use stone
5. 10 Amvr. JuR., Carriers § 1441 (1937).
6. Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 106 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.S.C. 1952);
Waddell v. Crescent Motors, Inc., 260 Ala. 124, 69 So. 2d 414 (1953); Miller v.
Mills, 257 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1953); Louisville Ry. v. Logan, 306 Ky. 35, 206
S.W.2d 80 (1947); Schooler v. Louisville & I.R.R., 259 Ky. 80, 82 S.W.2d 221
(1935); Baker v. Shreveport Ry., 68 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1953); Bennevendo v.
Houston Transit Co., 238 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Annot., 15 A.L.R.
887 (1921); 10 Am. JuR., Carriers § 1467 (1937). See also, Harper and Kime,
The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 901 (1934).
7. Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61 HARV. L. REv. 205,
212 (1947).
8. 259 Ky. 80, 82 S.W.2d 221 (1935).
9. Griffith v. Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132 Pac. 57 (1913); Gable v. Kansas City,
148 Mo. 470, 50 S.W. 84 (1899); Dubois v. Kingston, 102 N.Y. 219, 6 N.E. 273
(1886).
10. Stair v. Kane, 156 Fed. 100 (6th Cir. 1907); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Netolicky, 67 Fed. 665 (8th Cir. 1895); Martinez v. Planel, 36 Cal. 578 (1869);
Long v. John Breuner Co.,-36 Cal. App. 630, 172 Pac. 1132 (1918); Nave v. Flack,
90 Ind. 205, 46 Am. Rep. 205 (1883); Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Meyers, 150 Ky.
841, 151 S.W. 19 (1912); Crocker v. McGregor, 76 Me. 282, 49 Am. Rep. 611
(1884); Commercial Club v. Epperson, 15 Tenn. App. 649 (1932); Cole v. North
Danville Coop. Creamery, 103 Vt. 32, 151 Atl. 568 (1930).
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crossties to eliminate the danger of decay inherent in wooden ones.
In the instant case, the court in effect affirmed a finding that the risk
of injury to passengers from thrown objects outweighed the expense
of equipping the trolley cars with full-length window screens or safety-
glass windows. Under similar circumstances, a number of courts might
have reached a different conclusion.
TORTS-PROPERTY RIGHTS-DEPRIVATION OF ELECTIVE
OFFICE IN LABOR UNION
Plaintiff brought suit against fellow members of a labor union to
recover the salary of an elective union office and punitive damages. He
alleged that in an election for the position, which he had held for seven
years, he received the majority of the votes cast but was deprived of
the office by defendants' alteration or erasure of the markings on the
ballots. The trial court entered judgment for defendants for failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action, and plaintiff appealed. Held,
reversed. Wrongful deprivation of office in a labor union gives rise to a
cause of action in tort for wrongful interference with a business or
property right. Longo v. Reilly, 35 N.J. Super. 405, 114 A.2d 302 (App.
Div. 1955).
Interference with a person's business or occupation is invasion of a
property right and, therefore, a compensable tort. Liability was
originally determined by the harshness of the means used by the de-
fendant;' today it is found if the conduct was intentional and un-
privileged.2 Where a competitor has used ruthless business tactics, 3 or
where a labor union has procured the discharge of the plaintiff from
his employment,4 the courts have reasoned that the defendant in-
fringed upon the plaintiff's property right in his business or occupa-
tion.
Actions to recover for deprivation of elective office in government or
in a voluntary association have not been placed in the category of
1. Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 At]. 595 (1909); Keeble v. Hickeringill
11 East. 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707); Temperton v. Russell, [1893]
1 Q.B. 715.
2. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Katz
v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935); Skene v. Carayanis, 103
Conn. 708, 131 Atl. 497 (1926); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946
(1909); Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 Atl. 62 (1934); Mogul
S.S. Co. v. McGregor, [1892] A.C. 25.
3. See note 2 supra.
4. Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, Local 24, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Cook v. John H. Mathis Co., 1 N.J. Super. 335, 61 A.2d 585
(Ch. 1948); Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J. Eq. 593, 177 Atl. 102 (1935), affd,
119 N.J. Eq. 377, 182 Atl. 874 (1936); Brennan v. United Hatters, Local 17,
73 N.J.L. 729, 65 Atl. 165 (1906).
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interference with a business or occupation.5 A "property right"
analysis is often made, but liability in the majority of the cases has
been determined by certainty of pecuniary loss. The court in Talton
v. Behncke6 rejected the counterclaim of the defendant, who had been
recalled from a union office and granted a pension equal in amount to
his former salary, on the ground that "the only loss he has suffered is his
pleasure and satisfaction in being president of the union-a privilege
not of a legal character."7 In Way v. Patton,8 the court stated that,
when the defendant ruled that the elective office which plaintiff sought
could not exist under the organization's constitution, "plaintiffs had no
property rights whatever in the premises, as they had not yet been
elected."9 A candidate deprived of victory in a primary election is
deemed to suffer no pecuniary loss when it cannot be shown that he
would have won the general election.'0 The courts apparently refuse to
recognize that a chance of financial gain unaccompanied by any risk 'of
loss can have value," and there seems no inclination to consider the
chance a property right.
In the instant case, the requisite certainty of pecuniary loss was pro-
vided by the allegations that, but for defendants' conduct, plaintiff
would have won the election. However, the court's statement that
"office in a labor union is a property right [and] so is the right to be a
candidate therefor"12 seems contrary to the views expressed in-Way v.
Patton3 and the majority of the election cases.14 The court seemed
inclined to classify the tort more particularly as an interference with
plaintiff's business or occupation, a novel analysis which could be
justified by the fact that the office had been plaintiff's sole means of
livelihood for seven years.
5. Shields v. Booles, 238 Ky. 673, 38 S.W.2d 677 (1931); Valdez v. Gonzales,
50 N.M. 28, 176 P.2d 173 (1946); Schwartz v. Hefferman, 304 N.Y. 474, 109
N.E.2d 68 (1952); Frank v. Eaton, 225 App. Div. 149, 231 N.Y. Supp. 477 (3d
Dep't 1928).
6. 199 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1952).
7. Id. at 474. Contra, Bianco v. Eisen, 190 Misc. 609, 75 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Sup.
Ct. 1944).
8. 195 Ore. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952).
9. 241 P.2d at 903-04.
10. United States v. Randle, 39 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. La. 1941); Hill v. Carr,
186 111. App. 515 (1914); Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W.2d 189 (1944).
11. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 31 (1935); Note, 46 HARV. L. REV. 699 (1933).
12. Instant case at 306.
13. 195 Ore. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952).
14. Cases cited notes 5, 6, 10 supra.
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